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1. Introduction 
  With the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(ACA), policymakers face the challenge of minimizing health care costs while 
maintaining or improving quality of care. One prominent approach shifts provider 
reimbursement from fee-for-service to episode-based payments to improve 
efficiency and accountability. For example, the Center for Medicaid and Medicare 
Services is currently piloting programs that provide a fixed payment for an acute 
hospital stay and any subsequent post-acute care (CMS 2011).  However, these 
reforms require an appropriate definition of a treatment "episode" and 
understanding the effects of alternate reimbursement rules.  
  How can prior experience with payment change inform the current efforts 
to reform Medicare reimbursement? The Medicare home health benefit has 
transitioned through multiple reimbursement regimes and thus provides an 
excellent laboratory to study the influence of marginal and average 
reimbursement changes on home health admissions, provider costs, and Medicare 
costs.  
In 1983, in an attempt to curtail rapidly increasing inpatient hospital costs, 
Medicare instituted the Inpatient Prospective Payment System, which provides a 
single payment for the inpatient stay, based on principal diagnosis, complications 
and comorbidities, procedure use, and local wages. However, post-acute services 
including home health care were still reimbursed on a cost basis subject to upper 
limits. As a result, admissions, patient visits, and resource use skyrocketed in 
home health agencies, resulting in Medicare home health expenditures increasing 
from $2 billion in 1987 to $17 billion in 1997 (MedPAC 2002).  
  In the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA 1997), Congress responded to 
spiraling post-acute care use by mandating prospective payment systems for post-
acute care.  Because a workable system for home health agencies was not 
available, the Congress mandated the almost immediate adoption of an "Interim   3 
Payment System" (IPS) in October 1997.  The IPS imposed substantially lower 
limits on Medicare reimbursement to home health agencies.  It reduced average 
payments per visit and effectively eliminated marginal reimbursement past the 
limits. Subsequently, Medicare devised a home health agency prospective 
payment system (PPS) that provided reimbursement for each 60-day home health 
episode as a function of patients' clinical status, functional status, and service use 
(MedPAC 2010a). The PPS, implemented in October 2000, increased average 
payments to home health agencies, but, by some metrics, marginal reimbursement 
within a 60-day home health episode was further reduced
1.  
  A number of papers examine the impacts of the Home Health IPS and PPS 
on payments, costs, and patient outcomes.  Previous research has shown that the 
IPS reduced both the probability of using home health and the number of visits 
per patient (McCall et al. 2001, 2003b, McKnight 2006, MedPAC 2010a). This 
decrease in utilization was concentrated in less healthy Medicare patients but had 
little to no effect on adverse health outcomes (McKnight 2006). Additionally, 
over 30 percent of home health agencies exited after the IPS (MedPAC 2010b).  
Exiting facilities had a higher intensity of visits per patient, while newer and 
smaller providers in more competitive markets were able to expand their market 
share (Porel et al. 2006). Research on the PPS is more limited, but finds a greater 
use of therapy relative to home health aide visits, with little overall effect on 
patient outcomes or quality of care (Schlenker et al. 2005, MedPAC 2010b).  
  In this paper, we contribute to the previous literature by contrasting the 
Home Health IPS and PPS in a single unified framework, contrasting their 
differing effects on marginal and average reimbursement. We describe a 
conceptual framework that models home health agencies’ admission and 
treatment policies as a function of Medicare reimbursement policy and provides 
                                                 
  There are outlier payments for exceptionally costly patients, per visit payments for "short stay" outliers, and 
until 2008 agencies received additional payment for providing 10 or more rehabilitation visits.   4 
separate predictions for the IPS and the PPS. We develop an empirical strategy 
that simulates changes in admissions and resource use after each policy shift for a 
constant cohort of patients, thereby controlling for patient selection or changes in 
the composition of patients over time. Additionally, we estimate admission and 
treatment functions for a single cohort of patients, and use the estimates to 
simulate admission probabilities and resource use for successive patient cohorts to 
isolate selection effects.  We also investigate the impacts of each policy on patient 
outcomes including mortality and hospital readmission. Finally, we estimate 
heterogeneous effects on admissions and costs based on differential changes in 
Medicare payments to further gauge the relative importance of average and 
marginal reimbursement. Throughout our empirical analysis, we use a rich dataset 
comprised of 100 percent Medicare acute and post-acute claims, denominator 
files, and provider data over the period 1996 through 2002.  
  Our conceptual model predicts that home health agencies’ admissions and 
resource use will decrease with the IPS, but shows that the PPS has ambiguous 
effects due to offsetting changes in marginal and average reimbursement. Our 
estimates confirm that the IPS substantially decreased Medicare payments. We 
show that this decline in average and marginal reimbursement led to a sharp 
decline in home health admissions and resource use conditional on admission. In 
contrast, while the PPS increased average payments to providers above pre-IPS 
levels (in nominal terms), admissions and resource use conditional on admission 
increased only marginally.  In both cases, we find little evidence of an effect on 
mortality or readmissions. We find heterogeneous effects on costs that vary with 
differential changes in average payments. Overall our results suggest that 
providers are responsive to both marginal and average reimbursement in 
determining treatment intensity and admissions, however changes in resource use 
and admissions induced by these payment changes had little impact on the patient 
health outcomes.    5 
  The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background on home 
health agencies and changes in reimbursement policy. Section 3 discusses our 
conceptual framework. Section 4 describes the data, section 5 discusses the 
empirical strategy, section 6 describes the results, and section 7 concludes.  
 
2. The Home Health IPS and PPS 
  Home health agencies provide skilled nursing, physical therapy, nurse 
aide, and medical social work services to Medicare beneficiaries who are unable 
to leave their homes without difficulty.  In 2008, 3.2 million fee-for-service 
patients received the home-health benefit, resulting in $17 billion in Medicare 
home health expenditures (MedPAC 2010b).   
In 1983, the Medicare inpatient prospective payment system was 
implemented, providing a single payment to providers for an acute care episode as 
a function of patients' principal diagnosis, procedures used, complications and 
comorbidities, and adjustments based on local labor market conditions. At the 
same time, Medicare home health reimbursement was still cost-based (as were 
other post-acute settings), with limits based on the lower of an average cost per 
visit or total "reasonable costs" (Grimaldi 2002). Acute care length-of-stay 
steadily decreased in the years immediately following the acute PPS, with little 
immediate change in post-acute use. Court decisions in the late 1980s, however, 
held certain regulations governing eligibility for post-acute services to be illegal.  
Subsequently acute providers "unbundled" the marginal day from the acute 
inpatient episode and moved it to a post-acute setting, thereby receiving marginal 
reimbursement from Medicare.  Indeed, the early 1990s saw explosive growth in 
hospital-based post-acute units and post-acute care use more generally (Newhouse 
2002).  Between 1987 and 1997, the number of Medicare patients using home 
health services doubled, the number of visits per patient increased from 23 to 78,   6 
and, as mentioned above, Medicare spending on home health services grew from 
$2 billion to $17 billion (Grimaldi 2002, MedPAC 2002). 
  Congress and Medicare responded to ballooning post-acute expenditures 
by mandating prospective payment systems for all types of post-acute care in the 
Balanced Budget Act of 1997, but also immediately imposed the Home Health 
Interim Payment System (IPS). For home health agencies that had entered the 
market after 1994 the IPS imposed a per-patient cap on visits equal to national 
median per-patient costs. For older facilities, the limit was a weighted average of 
census division per-patient costs (25%) and agency specific per-patient costs 
(75%) in 1994 (McKnight 2006). Additionally, services previously contracted out 
were subject to these limits (Grimaldi 2002).  Finally, the IPS also targeted 
fraudulent practices by home health providers.  
  The Home Health IPS was meant to be a temporary measure to contain 
home health costs, and, as called for in the law, a prospective payment system for 
home health was implemented October 1, 2000. The Home Health PPS provided 
prospective rates for a 60-day episode based on patients' home health resource 
group. The home health resource group was defined by clinical, functional, and 
service utilization attributes, based on nurse assessments (Grimaldi 2002).      
  Figure 1 shows average Medicare reimbursement per-home health patient 
separately for patients discharged from the hospital with a primary diagnosis of 
stroke, hip fracture, and joint replacement.   The first vertical line indicates the 
quarter prior to the Home Health IPS and the second vertical line indicates the 
quarter prior to the Home Health PPS.  This figure shows that the IPS 
considerably decreased average Medicare reimbursement for home health 
patients, while the PPS increased average reimbursement to above pre-IPS levels 
(in nominal terms).  Marginal reimbursement, however, was further reduced 
under the PPS. The independent trajectories of average and marginal payments   7 
under the IPS and PPS allow us to investigate the separate effects of marginal 
versus average reimbursement on admissions and resource use.  
 
3. Conceptual Framework 
  In this paper, we are interested in providers' decisions to admit patients 
and the level of treatment given to patients conditional on admission as a function 
of both average and marginal reimbursement. We use a conceptual model, 
developed by Sood et al. (2011), drawing on previous models by Hodgkin and 
McGuire (1994) and Ellis and McGuire (1996). Hodgkin and McGuire model 
providers' treatment policy as a function of marginal and average payments, 
where providers increase treatment intensity to attract new patients when they 
become more profitable. Ellis and McGuire explicitly model providers' admission 
and treatment policies as a function of reimbursement, although they do not 
distinguish between average or marginal reimbursement changes.  In contrast, we 
explicitly model providers' admissions and treatment policies as a function of both 
marginal and average reimbursement. 
Consider a non-profit home health agency that has to choose between 
j=1... N patients to admit for home health services. The provider chooses an 
admissions policy that determines the probability of admitting patient j (p) and a 
treatment policy that determines treatment intensity (c) for patient j, as a function 
of a fixed payment per patient (a) and marginal reimbursement (m) for additional 
services.  
  The provider maximizes the utility function, as in (1):    
                                       (1) 
with expected profits as in (2),  
                                  
         (2) 
The first order condition for the admissions decision is given in (3):    8 
                                        (3) 
Equation (3) implies that providers choose an admission policy such that the 
marginal utility of an increase in admission probability for a patient j equals the 
change in profits from admitting the patient times the marginal utility of profits.  
Equation (3) also implies that any patient j that is profitable (taking c as fixed) 
will be admitted, assuming no capacity constraints. Any reduction in marginal 
reimbursement (m) or the fixed payment (a) will decrease the profitability of 
patient j and lower j’s probability of home health admission. This condition 
predicts that the Home Health IPS, characterized by a reduction in both a and m, 
would reduce admissions.   
A for-profit agency is assumed to take all patients for whom E( ) is 
positive if there are no capacity constraints.  If there are such constraints, the 
provider takes the most profitable patients until the constraint is binding.  Like the 
nonprofit case, decreases in a or m will render some marginal patients 
unprofitable.   
The Home Health PPS, however, was characterized by an increase in a 
fixed payment per 60-day episode, which increased average reimbursement, and a 
decrease in marginal reimbursement (for 5 or more visits in an episode m =0). 
Thus, the model offers ambiguous general predictions on the impact of the PPS on 
patient volume.  
  Equation (4) shows the first order condition determining the nonprofit 
provider's treatment. We assume that an increase in c attracts more patients and 
that the added patients are drawn at random from the same distribution as existing 
patients.   
                                    
       (4) 
This condition implies that providers choose intensity for patient j such that the 
marginal utility of intensity is equal to the change in profits times the marginal   9 
utility of profits.  Profits change for two reasons. First, increasing intensity 
reduces profits as long as marginal reimbursement is less than one. Second, 
increasing intensity increases profits due to an increase in demand or admissions 
as long as the marginal patient is profitable. A for-profit agency will choose c to 
attract profitable patients subject to a capacity constraint (or a population 
constraint on profitable patients).  Equation (4) shows that marginal 
reimbursement and treatment intensity are positively related.  An increase in 
average reimbursement increases profits, decreasing the marginal utility of 
profits; as a result, average reimbursement and treatment intensity are also 
positively related.  Any competition from other post-acute providers strengthens 
this relationship. Thus, this condition predicts that the IPS would lead to lower 
treatment intensity, as marginal and average reimbursement decreased. Again, this 
condition offers ambiguous predictions for the PPS.  The increase in average 
reimbursement offsets the decrease in marginal reimbursement, leading to 
ambiguous effects on treatment intensity.   
   
4. Data 
We use two separate samples of patients for analyses of the Home Health 
IPS and PPS. The sample for the IPS includes patients discharged from acute care 
between January 1996 and June 1999. The IPS was implemented in October 1997, 
so this provides seven quarters of discharges before and after the IPS. The sample 
for the PPS includes patients discharged from acute care between January 1999 
and June 2002. The PPS was implemented in October 2000, so this again provides 
seven quarters of acute discharges before and after the PPS.    10 
The sample consists of patients whose principal diagnosis at acute 
admission was stroke, lower extremity joint replacement, or hip fracture
2. The 
units of analysis are individual acute discharges, where outcomes are measured 
over the initial acute stay plus a fixed episode period following the acute 
discharge. Our main analysis uses a post-acute episode length of 90 days; thus, 
any acute admission occurring during the 90 days following the acute discharge is 
labeled an acute readmission. 
3 We link a number of data sources to construct the 
covariates and outcomes variables used in our analysis.  In this section we 
describe the construction of the measures used in the analysis.  
a. Medicare Payment and Costs 
We use the Medicare FFS claims data linked to data from Medicare cost 
reports to construct the key payment (i.e. Medicare reimbursement) and cost 
measures. The Medicare claims data include 100 percent Medicare standard 
analytic files (SAF) for home health agency claims linked with 100 percent 
MEDPAR data for acute hospital, inpatient rehabilitation facility, and long term 
care hospital claims from January 1996 to June 2002.  We define home health 
reimbursement for each observation as total Medicare payments to home health 
agencies occurring within a 90-day post-acute episode following an initial acute 
care discharge.  To measure costs, we multiply the number of visits during a 90-
day post-acute episode by a facility's cost per visit (for a given calendar year) 
obtained from Medicare cost reports.  
                                                 
2  Stroke patients are defined as those with a principal diagnosis in the acute hospital stay of intracerebral 
hemorrhage (diagnosis code 431.xx), occlusion and stenosis of precerebral arteries with infarction (433.x1), 
occlusion of cerebral arteries with infarction (434.x1), or acute but ill-de ned cerebrovascular disease 
(436.xx). Hip fracture patients are defined as patients with a primary diagnosis of fractures of the neck or the 
femur (820.xx). Lower extremity joint replacement patients were defined as patients with a primary diagnosis 
for joint replacement, excluding hip fracture patients and patients with reattachment procedures.   
 
3 Longer post-acute episodes may capture later unrelated readmissions and subsequent costs, whereas shorter 
episodes may miss related costs, readmissions, and patient outcome. In analyses not reported, we examine the 
sensitivity of the results to differing post-acute episode lengths and find similar results.  
   11 
b. Patient Characteristics 
  We use information from the acute claims files and enrollment files to 
measure patient characteristics. For each patient, we collect (and control for) the 
list of comorbidities developed by Elixhauser et al. (1998)
4. We use information 
from Medicare enrollment files to describe patient demographics including 
gender, age (indicators for five-year bands), race, and whether the patient lives in 
a MSA, adjacent to a MSA, or in a rural area. We also control for whether 
patients are dual eligibles (i.e. receive Medicaid due to low-income).  
c. Health Outcomes 
  Our primary health outcome is mortality at the end of a 90-day episode, 
measured from the Medicare denominator or enrollment file. We also measure 
readmissions to acute care within the 90-day post-acute episode using the claims 
data. 
d. Provider characteristics 
  Our analysis also controls for the characteristics of discharging acute 
providers (i.e., hospitals), as these may influence post-acute care. We derive 
information on the Medicare percentage of patient days in the previous year from 
providers’ cost reports to CMS. We use the Medicare Provider of Services file (a 
provider level database maintained by CMS) to determine the ownership status of 
a particular facility (government, non-profit, or for profit) and the size of a facility 
(average daily census and number of beds). We use information from the Acute 
Impact file on average daily census, teaching status (acute resident to average 
daily census ratio), and low-income (Disproportionate Share-DSH) patient 
percentage as additional controls.  
                                                 
4 Comorbidities include AIDS, alcoholism, deficiency anemias, rheumatoid arthritis/ collagen vascular 
diseases, blood loss anemia, congestive heart failure, chronic pulmonary disease, coagulopathy, depression, 
diabetes with chronic complications, diabetes without chronic complications, drug abuse, hypothyroidism, 
liver disease, lymphoma, fluid and electrolyte disorders, metastatic cancer, other neurologic disorders, 
obesity, paralysis, peripheral vascular disease, psychoses, pulmonary circulation disease, renal failure, solid 
tumor without metastasis, peptic ulcer disease excluding bleeding, valvular disease, and weight loss.    12 
  Our IPS base sample consists of 980,905, 727,941, and 864,664 episodes 
of care for stroke, hip fracture, and joint replacement. We dropped one percent of 
stroke episodes, two percent of hip fracture episodes, and one percent of joint 
replacement episodes due to missing cost information and other missing data.  
Our PPS base sample includes 908,706, 702,137, and 948,938 episodes of care for 
stroke, hip fracture, and joint replacement.  We dropped one percent of 
observations for each condition due to missing data. Summary statistics spanning 
the entire sample period (from 1996 q1 through 2002 q2) are displayed in Table 1.  
 
5. Empirical Approach 
  Within a home health agency unconditional costs (i.e., across all acute 
discharges whether or not admitted to an home health agency) can change after a 
reimbursement change either because of changes in the probability of being 
admitted (p) or changes in costs conditional on being admitted (c). In addition, the 
probability of being admitted and conditional costs are both functions of 
individual characteristics (x).  
  After payment reform, changes in admission probabilities originate from 
the admission policies of home health agencies for a given patient (the shift from 
p 
pre  to 
 p 
post in equation 7) and from changes in the composition of individuals 
discharged from acute care hospitals (the shift from x 
pre  to 
 x 
post  in equation 7) 
5.  
              
                 
              (7) 
  The goal of our empirical strategy is to disentangle admission policy 
changes from shifts in the composition of acute discharges. Equation (7) can be 
rewritten as in (8):  
            
                
               
                 
             (8) 
                                                 
  Cost sharing for patients did not change so changes in admission probabilities are unlikely to change from 
the patient side.    13 
The first term in equation (8) represents the admission policy effect - changes in 
the probability of admission holding the acute discharge cohort constant. The 
second term in (8) represents the composition effect - changes in the probability 
of admission from changes in the characteristics of individuals discharged from 
acute care hospitals, holding admission policies constant.  
  We separately estimate the "admission policy" and "composition" effects 
in equation (8). First, we model home health admissions in each quarter of the 
data as a function of health, demographic, provider, and geographic 
characteristics described in the data section above using a probit model, for each 
quarter q of our data in the pre and post policy change periods, as in (9).  
                                         (9) 
The separate estimates of   and   for each quarter are then used to construct an 
"admission simulator."  We apply the coefficient estimates from each quarter to a 
constant cohort of acute-care discharges: for the IPS this quarter is the first 
quarter of 1996, for the PPS this cohort is from the first quarter of 1999. We 
create a synthetic panel of simulated admission probabilities, such that the sample 
is held constant and only the policy rules (as a function of observable 
characteristics) change.  
  We then estimate interrupted time-series models as in (10), regressing 
projected home health probabilities on a linear quarterly trend and indicator 
variables for the seven quarters following each policy change.  
       
                                
 
       (10) 
The estimates of   represent average differences (relative to the counterfactual 
quarterly time trend) in simulated admissions in each quarter after the policy 
change for the base cohort.   
  To estimate the "composition" effect, we apply the "admissions simulator" 
from the last quarter of each sample (representing the post-IPS/PPS admissions 
policy) to each successive cohort of acute discharges.  We then estimate equation 
  
   14 
(10), but this time the estimates of   represent changes in admissions stemming 
from changes in the composition of patients discharged from acute hospitals.  
  Next, we examine changes in costs of patients seen in home health 
agencies. Changes in costs can change based on home health agencies’ treatment 
policies (the shift from c 
pre  to 
 c 
post to in equation 11), and from changes in the 
composition of patients in home health agencies (the shift from x 
pre  to 
 x 
post  in 
equation 11).  
              
                 
                 (11) 
  Our goal is to disentangle treatment policy changes from shifts in the 
composition of patients seen in home health agencies. Equation (11) can be 
equivalently rewritten as in (12):  
            
                
               
                 
             (12)   
The first portion of equation (12) represents changes in costs in home health 
agencies due to changes in treatment policy, and the second portion represents 
changes in costs due to changes in the composition of patients seen in home 
health agencies (i.e. the selection effect).  
  We separately estimate treatment and selection effects.  First, we model 
costs incurred by home health agencies as a function of individual, provider, and 
geographic characteristics (the same as those used for modeling admission 
policies) for home health agencies patients separately for each quarter using OLS, 
as in (13).  
              
                    (13) 
The separate estimates of   and   for each quarter are then used to create a 
"treatment simulator," projecting costs in each quarter of the sample (pre and 
post- reimbursement policy change) for a fixed cohort of home health patients. 
We then estimate an interrupted time series model, as in (14). The subsequent   
estimates can then be used to trace out changes in conditional costs due solely to 
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changes in treatment policy, isolated from changes in home health agencies’ 
patient composition from selection.  
         
                                
 
       (14) 
To estimate the "selection" effect, we apply a treatment simulator from a single 
and constant quarter to each successive cohort of home health patients. These 
projected costs only demonstrate changes due to selection, as the treatment 
simulator is held constant. We estimate models like that in (14), but this time the 
coefficient estimates indicate changes in costs coming from selection.  
  Changes in admission and treatment policies in home health agencies 
could potentially impact acute readmissions and patient health outcomes.  We use 
a similar empirical strategy to examine effects on readmission probabilities and 
patient health outcomes.  In a sensitivity analysis, we examine differences in 
home health admissions, costs, and outcomes between hospital service areas 
experiencing larger and smaller payment changes after the IPS, similar to that in 
McKnight (2006). 
Finally, we investigate heterogeneous changes in costs and admission 
probabilities across patients with heterogeneous changes in payments.  For this, 
we again create a synthetic panel and regress changes in projected home health 
costs or admissions (as a function of observable characteristics) on changes in 
home health payments before and after each payment reform.  
 
6. Results 
  Our results section proceeds as follows. First we examine the effects of 
payment reforms on Medicare payments to home health agencies, home health 
agency costs, and admissions. Next, we examine effects on acute readmissions 
and health outcomes. We perform sensitivity analyses comparing changes in 
outcomes in hospital service areas with larger and smaller changes in payment 
after the IPS. Finally, we investigate the presence of heterogeneous effects of the   16 
IPS and the PPS on home health agency costs and admissions by patients with 
differential changes in average payments. 
6.1. Effects of IPS and PPS on home health payments, costs, and admissions 
  We begin by graphically examining the effects of reimbursement policy 
changes. Figure 2 shows treatment and admission policy effects of the IPS and 
PPS for stroke patients. In each case, the solid line represents the mean 
"simulated" value for each quarter in the synthetic panel, where the patient cohort 
includes patients from the first quarter of 1996 (for the IPS) or the first quarter of 
1999 (for the PPS) and outcomes are simulated for each subsequent quarter, using 
quarter-specific probit estimates for admission probabilities or OLS estimates for 
payments and costs. This approach allows us to focus on change due solely to 
changes in treatment and admissions policies (as a function of patients' observable 
characteristics), as opposed to changes in the composition of patients in home 
health agencies or composition of patients discharged from acute care.  The 
dashed line represents a quarterly linear time trend estimated in the pre-policy 
change period, representing the counterfactual trend in the post-policy change 
period. Finally, the dotted line represents actual average outcomes in each quarter.  
Payments 
  Figure 2a traces out home health payments before and after the IPS 
implementation.  After remaining constant over the pre-IPS period, average home 
health payments fell substantially after the IPS, from over $2,800 to under $2,200 
for stroke patients. In contrast, after the Home Health PPS average Medicare 
payments to home health agencies for stroke patients increased considerably 
relative to the pre-reform trend (Figure 2b).  Table 2a, Panel 1 displays estimates 
from regressing simulated payments on indicators for the first seven quarters after 
the IPS and the PPS, controlling for a quarterly trend. By the second year after the 
IPS, payments were reduced by approximately $750; after the PPS, payments had 
increased by a similar amount.  Tables 2b and c present IPS and PPS payment   17 
effects for hip fracture and joint patients and exhibit larger PPS effects relative to 
the IPS effects.  
Costs 
Figures 2c and 2d show costs simulated in each quarter for a constant cross-
section of home health patients before and after the IPS and PPS. Figure 2c shows 
a reduction in costs after the IPS, from over $3,000 in the first quarter of 1997 to 
under $2,600 at the end of 1999, mirroring the decline in average payments to 
home health providers in Figure 2a.  However, while average payments increased 
after the PPS, costs increased only a marginal amount relative to the 
counterfactual trend (in Figure 2d). Table 2a, Section 2 shows this in greater 
detail. Although the decrease in costs after the IPS was comparable to the 
decrease in average payment, the increase in costs after the PPS was only around 
1/3 of the increase in payments for stroke patients. Table 2b exhibits similar 
patterns for hip fracture. In Table 2c, increases in resource use for joint 
replacement placement after the PPS are larger in magnitude than post-IPS 
decreases, but still small in proportion to the increase in home health payments.  
Admissions 
  Figures 2e and 2f show admissions over the simulated panel. The 
probability of using home health services decreased by over 6 percentage points 
after the IPS, again coinciding with the decrease in Medicare reimbursement. 
However, home health admissions actually decreased further after the PPS for 
stroke patients, despite the increased average generosity towards home health 
agencies. Similar patterns are exhibited for hip fracture and joint replacement 
patients in Tables 2 b and c, Section 3.  
  Figure 2 and Table 2 show that the IPS and PPS had similar magnitude 
effects on Medicare payments to home health agencies (with the IPS reducing and 
the PPS increasing payments); however, while the IPS substantially decreased 
home health costs and probability of use, the PPS led to smaller increases in costs   18 
and actually decreased use of home health (for the tracer conditions in our 
sample). These asymmetries may be due to the change in marginal reimbursement 
under these systems. The IPS decreased both average and marginal 
reimbursement, while the PPS increased average reimbursement but further 
decreased marginal reimbursement. These results show the relative importance of 
average and marginal reimbursement in determining providers' admissions and 
treatment policies. Although we do not quantify the reduction in marginal 
reimbursement after the PPS, it may have offset the increased Medicare 
generosity in determining costs and visits per patient, and more than offset 
increased payments in the determination of home health agencies’ admission 
policies for stroke, hip fracture, and joint replacement patients.  
Selection 
  Home health costs could also change due to selection; that is, the 
composition of patients using home health services could change with 
reimbursement policy.  Similarly, the probability of home health use could change 
with the composition of patients discharged from acute care hospitals. As 
explained above, we examine selection by estimating OLS and probit regressions 
expressing costs and probability of home health use as a function of patient, 
provider, and geographical characteristics in the last quarter of each sample (1999 
q2 for the IPS, 2002 q2 for the PPS), and then applying these coefficient estimates 
to each home health patient cohort and acute hospital discharge cohort to simulate 
home health costs and admissions (respectively). In this case, treatment and 
admission policies are held constant, but the cohorts differ. Thus, changes in costs 
and admissions are attributable to changes in patient composition. However, 
Figure 3 (and the similarity between actual and simulated outcomes in Figure 2) 
implies that changes in patient composition had small effects on Medicare 
reimbursement, home health costs, and home health admissions for stroke patients   19 
after both the IPS and the PPS. Table 3 shows similarly small effects across 
stroke, hip fracture, and joint replacement patients.  
  These results imply that little “cream skimming” based on observable 
characteristics occurred in home health agencies.  However, if there were 
changing unobservable characteristics, then our treatment and admission policy 
estimates may also reflect such selection. However, given the fact that we observe 
little selection occurring based on observable characteristics suggests that 
unobservable characteristics, which are likely correlated with observable 
characteristics, also stay constant over this period.  
  In Appendix Figure 1, we examine changes in patient composition more 
directly by plotting the fraction of home health patients with three or more 
comorbidities versus no comorbidities, and two or more complications versus 
zero complications
6. We find smooth trends (with some seasonality) in these 
outcomes in each quarter over the sample period, with little obvious change after 
either reform.   
The estimates thus far have examined changes in composition occurring 
within tracer conditions. Next, we investigate the changes in composition 
occurring across tracer conditions. Appendix Figure 2 plots the relative fractions 
of hip fracture, stroke, and joint replacement patients in home health agencies and 
implies increases in joint replacement patients relative to hip and stroke patients. 
We present selection estimates in Figure 4 and Table 3d that pool acute 
discharges and home health patients across the three tracer conditions, and thus 
                                                 
6 Complications are from the preceding acute stay and may include post-operative 
pulmonary compromise; post-operative gastrointestinal hemorrhage; cellulitis or 
decubitus ulcer; septicemia; pneumonia; mechanical complications due to a device, 
implant, or graft; shock or arrest in the hospital; post-operative myocardial infarction; 
post-operative cardiac abnormalities other than AMI; procedure-related perforation or 
laceration; venous thrombosis and pulmonary embolism; acute renal failure; 
miscellaneous complications; delirium; and dementia (a selection of complications 
pertinent to post-acute care utilization selected from Iezzoni (1994)).   20 
exhibit changes in costs and admissions reflecting changes in composition both 
within and across tracer conditions. These estimates show only small changes in 
costs and admissions (of mixed direction and statistical significance), implying 
minimal changes in costs or admissions from changes in composition across 
tracer conditions among acute discharges and home health patients.  
6.2. Effects of IPS and PPS on acute readmissions and mortality  
  Reductions in home health costs and admissions may have impacts on 
patient health outcomes. To examine this, we estimate the impact of the IPS and 
PPS on acute readmissions within 90 days following acute discharge. Because we 
found little evidence of changes in costs or admissions stemming from patient 
composition, we only simulate changes in outcomes for a constant cohort of 
patients. Specifically, we estimate the probability of death or readmission in each 
quarter as a function of observable characteristics, and project the coefficient 
estimates from each quarter to a constant patient cohort. Figure 5 plots simulated 
acute readmissions and mortality (within a 90 day post-acute episode in each 
case) for stroke patients before and after the IPS and PPS. In Tables 4 and 5, 
reflecting the seasonality of these measures, we regress simulated outcomes on 
indicators for calendar quarter, calendar quarter interacted with “POST” reform 
indicators, and a linear time trend. The figures show little change in patient 
outcomes after each reform. While the POST-quarter interactions are often 
statistically significant, they are small in magnitude and in conflicting directions.  
While these estimates suggest that there was little effect of either home health 
payment reform on mortality and readmissions, we cannot rule out effects on 
more intermediate outcomes such as functional status that we are unable to 
measure in our data. However, large effects on functional status may be unlikely 
given the strong association between functional status and mortality (Scott et al. 
1997).  
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6.3. Geographic variation in Home Health IPS 
Our main analyses estimate the impacts of payment reform on Medicare 
payments, costs, admissions, and other outcomes by comparing post-reform 
changes to a pre-reform linear time trend.  For example, following the Home 
Health IPS, we find sharp breaks in the pre-reform time trend for payments, 
admissions, and costs, but no break in trends for mortality and readmissions.  
However, to definitively distinguish the effects of policy impacts from other 
contemporaneous trends, we require exogenous treatment and control groups. 
While such a control group does not exist (as far as we know) for the Home 
Health Prospective Payment System, per-patient visit limits for Medicare 
reimbursement after the Interim Payment System were based in part on an 
agency's historical average (75%), and in part on the average visits per patient 
across an agency's census division. Thus, facilities with average per-patient visits 
above the division average will experience greater reduction in Medicare 
reimbursement than facilities below the division average
7. Similarly, patients in 
geographical areas with facilities that provided, on average, higher than their 
division’s average number of visits will be exposed to a greater reduction in 
reimbursement than patients in geographic areas with facilities below their 
division’s average number of visits.  We plot simulated payments, costs, and 
admissions separately for stroke patients in hospital service areas (defined by 
Dartmouth (1996)) that are above and below their respective census division 
means in Figure 6. In this case, we simulate payments, costs, home health 
admissions, and outcomes in each quarter separately for two base cohorts of 
patients (acute discharges in 1996 q1) living in hospital service areas with average 
numbers of visits above and below their census division average
8. Thus, within 
                                                 
7 McKnight (2006) exploits this variation to examine intensity of care after the IPS. 
  A small number of hospital service areas have no home health agencies, as a result 
approximately 8 percent of observations are dropped for these analyses.    22 
each cohort over time variation comes in admission and treatment policies (as a 
function of patients’ observable characteristics), and changes in admission and 
treatment policies may vary between above and below-division mean hospital 
service areas.  
  Figure 6a shows a narrowing of home health payments after the IPS in the 
above and below division mean hospital service areas (for stroke patients), 
although the common payment reduction is larger than the differential change. 
Figures 6b-f shows that this narrowing also occurs for home health costs, but not 
for the probability of home health use, acute readmission or mortality.  Estimates 
from the regression analog of Figure 6 are displayed in Table 6. These 
specifications are similar to those in equations (10) and (14), except that the post 
indicators are interacted with an "above division mean" indicator variable and we 
include time (year-quarter) fixed effects instead of a quarterly trend.   
  Table 6, Columns 1-3, show that the decrease in payments and costs 
ranges between $50 and $125 larger for patients in above-division-mean hospital 
service areas (where the total average reduction was $750 for stroke patients). As 
in Figure 8, there is a differential reduction in costs for above-division health 
service areas, but small and mixed effects on home health admissions, acute 
readmissions, and mortality during the 90-day episode.  Appendix Tables 1a and b 
show similar patterns for hip fracture and joint replacement patients.  These 
estimates imply that reductions in treatment intensity, in particular, did not 
increase readmission rates or mortality.  
 6.4. Heterogeneous effects 
To investigate the relative importance of average versus marginal 
reimbursement, we investigate heterogeneity in the effects of reform by average 
payment change. While changes in overall payments after reforms may vary 
across patients, changes in marginal payments are more homogenous across 
patients. Thus, to the extent that changes in average payments are related to   23 
changes in admissions or costs, this may reflect the effects of average, as opposed 
to marginal, reimbursement on provider behavior. If changes in costs and 
admissions are not related to the changes in average payment, this may signal 
uniform changes in intensity and volume related to changes in marginal 
reimbursement.  
  In Table 7, we again create a synthetic patient panel and regress per-
patient simulated changes in home health costs and admissions as a function of 
changes in simulated home health payments, in each case between 1996 quarter 1 
and 1999 quarter 2 (for the IPS) and between 1999 quarter 1 and 2002 quarter 2 
(for the PPS). In Table 7a, we find mixed effects of payment changes on 
probability of home health use across tracer conditions after the IPS.  However, 
we show that changes in payments are positively related to changes in conditional 
costs, as well as unconditional costs.  In Table 7b, we show similarly mixed 
effects on probability of admission after the PPS, again with strong positive 
relationships between payments and costs. This result implies that patients 
exhibiting the largest increases in payments after the PPS received the largest 
increase in treatment intensity (costs). Thus, these estimates imply that average 
payments are also an important determinant of treatment intensity, but are less 
strongly associated with admissions.  
 
7. Conclusion 
  In this paper we examine the effects of changes in Medicare 
reimbursement for home health agencies, including the Interim Payment System 
(IPS) in 1997 and the Prospective Payment System (PPS) in 2000.  We build upon 
previous research by creating a unified framework to contrast these two unique 
changes in payment policy: one reducing both marginal and average 
reimbursement, the other increasing average reimbursement while reducing 
marginal reimbursement. We develop a conceptual model that predicts the   24 
decreases in both marginal and average reimbursement characterizing the IPS will 
lower both the volume of patients in home health agencies and intensity of 
treatment, but that offers ambiguous predictions for the PPS due to offsetting 
positive changes in average reimbursement but further reductions in marginal 
reimbursement.  We employ an empirical approach that separates changes in costs 
and admissions due to home health agencies’ admissions and treatment policies, 
and those due to the composition of patients discharged from acute care hospitals 
and admitted to home health agencies. We examine the impacts of the IPS and the 
PPS on acute readmissions and mortality.  Finally, we investigate the presence of 
heterogeneous effects based on differential changes in average reimbursement, to 
further gauge the relative importance of marginal and average reimbursement.  
  Consistent with our conceptual model, our estimates show that the IPS 
decreased home health costs and admissions. However, despite the substantial 
increase in reimbursement offered by the PPS, costs (resource use) increased only 
slightly and admissions actually decreased for the tracer conditions in our sample. 
For both the IPS and the PPS, we find little evidence of “cream skimming” based 
on the observable characteristics in our data. Both payment reforms had limited 
effects on acute readmissions and mortality. However, it may be the case that 
more intermediate outcomes such as functional gain not present in our data were 
affected by changes in treatment intensity and admission policies.  Changes in 
per-patient average reimbursement did predict resource use, and to a lesser extent 
probability of admissions.  However, in the PPS, increases in average 
reimbursement were almost totally offset by reductions in marginal 
reimbursement with respect to treatment intensity, and changes in marginal 
reimbursement completely offset increased average reimbursement with respect to 
admissions, implying that provider behavior may be more responsive to 
reimbursement at the margin.    25 
Our results suggest that reforms such as bundled payments and 
accountable care organizations that further reduce marginal reimbursement are 
likely to impact provider behavior. However, the level of payment is also 
important; if increased, reductions in resource use will translate to higher margins 
for providers (as in the PPS) rather than savings to Medicare (as in the IPS).  
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Figure 1. Average Medicare home health payments conditional on use  
 
Note: Figure shows average Medicare Fee-For-Service payments across 90-day post-acute episodes starting in each 
quarter between 1996q1 and 2002 q2 for stroke, hip fracture, and joint replacement patients. The first vertical line 
indicates quarter before Home Health IPS (10/1997). The second vertical line indicates the quarter prior to the Home 
Health PPS (10/2002).  
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Figure 2. Treatment and admission effects of Home Health Interim Payment System (IPS) and Prospective 
Payment System (PPS) on home health payments, costs, and admissions (stroke patients) 
 
a. IPS:  home health payments          b. PPS: home health payments 
       
c. IPS: home health costs            d. PPS: home health costs 
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e. IPS: home health admissions for 96q1 acute discharges   f. PPS: home health admissions for 99q1 acute discharges 
     
 
Note: Measures calculated from 100% Medicare Home Health claims data. Solid line indicates average simulated 
measures for each quarter. Dashed line indicates pre-IPS or PPS trend. Dotted line indicates actual means. Base cohort 
for IPS simulated values includes home health patients discharged from acute care for stroke in the first quarter of 1996 
(for payments and costs) and all acute discharges for stroke (for admissions). Base cohort for PPS simulated values 
includes home health patients discharged from acute care in the first quarter of 1999 (for payments and costs) and all 
acute discharges for stroke (for admissions). Vertical line in IPS graphs indicates quarter prior to Interim Payment 
System implementation, for PPS graphs quarter prior to Prospective Payment System implementation.    
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Figure 3. Selection effects for treatment and admissions for Home Health (HH) Interim Payment System (IPS) 
and Prospective Payment System (PPS) (stroke patients) 
 
a. IPS: 99q2 payments simulated for each HH cohort  b. PPS: 02q2 payments simulated for each HH cohort 
         
c. IPS: 99q2 costs simulated for each HH cohort    d. PPS: 02q2 costs simulated for each HH cohort
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e. IPS: 99q2 admits simulated each discharge cohort   f. PPS: 02q2 admits simulated for each discharge cohort 
     
 
Note: Measures calculated from 100% Medicare Home Health claims data. Solid line indicates average simulated 
measures for each quarter. Dashed line indicates pre-IPS or PPS trend. Vertical line in IPS graphs indicates quarter 
prior to Interim Payment System implementation, for PPS graphs quarter prior to Prospective Payment System 
implementation.    
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Figure 4. Selection estimates for pooled sample (acute discharges for stroke+hip+lower extremity joint 
replacement) 
a. IPS: 99q2 costs simulated for each HH cohort    b. PPS: 02q2 costs simulated for each HH cohort 
     
c. IPS: 99q2 admits simulated for each discharge cohort  d. PPS: 02q2 admits simulated for each discharge cohort
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e. IPS: Coef of var for simulated costs and admissions  f. PPS: Coef of var for simulated costs and admissions   
     
 
 
Note: Measures calculated from 100% Medicare Home Health claims data.  For a-d: Solid line indicates average 
simulated measures for each quarter. Dashed line indicates pre-IPS or PPS trend. For e-f: Solid line indicates 
coefficient of variation for home health predicted admissions and dotted line indicates coefficient of variation for home 
health predicted costs. 
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Figure 5. Simulated changes in outcomes 
a. IPS: readmission            b. PPS: readmission  
     
c. IPS: mortality             d. PPS Mortality   
     
Note: Solid line indicates average simulated measures for each quarter. Patient cohort is 96 q1 acute discharges for IPS, 99 q1 
acute discharges for PPS.  Dotted line indicates actual average health outcomes. Vertical line for IPS graphs indicates quarter prior 
to Home Health IPS implementation, for PPS graphs quarter prior to Home Health PPS implementation. 
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Figure 6. Simulated outcomes for hospital service areas above and below Census Division mean visits in 1996 
a. IPS: payments            b. IPS: costs              
     
 
d. IPS: admissions            e. IPS: Hospital readmissions        
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f. IPS: Mortality 
 
Note: Solid line indicates simulated outcomes in hospital service areas with average home health visits above census 
division mean, dashed line indicates simulated outcomes in hospital service areas with average home health visits 
below census division mean. Index patient cohort is 96 q1 acute discharges for IPS, 99 q1 acute discharges for PPS. 
Vertical line for IPS graphs indicates quarter prior to IPS implementation, for PPS graphs quarter prior to PPS 
implementation
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Notes: Sample includes 90-day episodes following acute discharges for each 
primary diagnosis occurring from January 1996 through June 2002. Measures 
calculated from Medicare claims and denominator files. 
Table 1. Summary Statistics   
  (1) Stroke 
90 day episode 
(2) Hip fracture,  
90 day episode 
(3) Joint,  
90 day episode 
Age  77.90 
 
82.43  73.58 
Male  0.41 
 
0.23  0.35 
White  0.83 
 
0.93 
 
0.91 
MSA  0.71 
 
0.71  0.69 
MSA adjacent 
 
0.16  0.16  0.17 
non-MSA 
 
0.13  0.13  0.14 
Comorbid 
conditions(any) 
 
0.72  0.78  0.54 
Comorbid 
conditions(n) 
 
1.26  1.49  0.82 
Complications 
(any) 
 
 
0.25  0.57  0.41 
Any home health  0.36 
 
0.45  0.61 
Home health 
payments 
(conditional on 
use)  
 
2705.70  2491.52  1887.53 
Home health 
costs 
(conditional on 
use) 
2764.26 
 
2404.48  1698.74 
Any re-admission  0.27  0.24  0.13 
N  1,738,220  1,311,755  1,671,211   39 
Table 2a. Treatment and admission policy estimates: effects of Home Health IPS and PPS, stroke patients 
   (1) 
Medicare home health payments 
(2) 
Home health costs  
(3) 
Home health admission 
  IPS  PPS  IPS  PPS  IPS  PPS 
Mean  2592  2737  2860  2572  0.386  0.332 
POST1  -179.08***  688.59***  -132.32***  -3.69  -0.024***  -0.031*** 
  (4.58)  (13.21)  (3.03)  (5.43)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
POST2  -391.78***  703.45***  -254.53***  116.98***  -0.062***  -0.018*** 
  (7.29)  (10.61)  (5.06)  (3.79)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
POST3  -576.50***  674.11***  -487.57***  45.72***  -0.052***  -0.029*** 
  (10.94)  (11.22)  (10.22)  (3.87)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
POST4  -700.22***  753.09***  -617.37***  99.65***  -0.059***  -0.029*** 
  (13.69)  (10.68)  (11.63)  (3.67)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
POST5  -746.19***  810.03***  -622.26***  184.09***  -0.058***  -0.019*** 
  (16.53)  (12.35)  (15.02)  (5.86)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
POST6  -713.63***  759.71***  -561.68***  263.13***  -0.059***  -0.015*** 
  (15.13)  (10.70)  (13.48)  (3.96)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
POST7  -696.43***  694.22***  -592.43***  228.15***  -0.063***  -0.018*** 
  (15.63)  (10.58)  (15.00)  (4.72)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Time trend  0.81  37.46***  6.15***  -10.62***  -0.001***  -0.001*** 
  (1.05)  (0.44)  (0.68)  (0.62)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Observations  441,952  327,264  441,952  327,264  1,049,510  933,688 
R-squared  0.32  0.72  0.21  0.04  0.18  0.05 
Notes: *** indicates significant at 1 percent level, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent. Estimates from regression of simulated payments, 
costs, or admissions on POST1-POST7 and quarterly trend. Index cohort is 96q1 patients for IPS, 99q1 patients for PPS. Standard 
errors clustered on health referral region are presented in parentheses. 
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Table 2b.Treatment and admission policy estimates: effects of Home Health IPS and PPS, hip fracture patients 
   (1) 
Medicare home health payments 
(2) 
Home health costs  
(3) 
Home health admission 
  IPS  PPS  IPS  PPS  IPS  PPS 
Mean  2255  2633  2479  2272  0.461  0.434 
POST1  -142.42***  898.95***  -88.71***  50.48***  -0.026***  -0.032*** 
  (2.32)  (9.78)  (2.29)  (3.56)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
POST2  -269.28***  929.24***  -151.68***  137.81***  -0.077***  -0.024*** 
  (3.58)  (6.39)  (2.60)  (4.03)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
POST3  -396.29***  867.07***  -309.10***  87.19***  -0.051***  -0.030*** 
  (8.34)  (4.47)  (7.36)  (4.15)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
POST4  -549.50***  924.67***  -477.24***  107.45***  -0.061***  -0.036*** 
  (7.42)  (3.86)  (6.80)  (4.78)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
POST5  -563.53***  978.09***  -452.24***  235.23***  -0.057***  -0.031*** 
  (7.80)  (4.24)  (6.78)  (5.51)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
POST6  -522.61***  882.60***  -391.34***  279.56***  -0.051***  -0.039*** 
  (9.25)  (5.15)  (8.07)  (6.34)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
POST7  -526.46***  787.49***  -434.20***  228.13***  -0.048***  -0.036*** 
  (7.68)  (3.93)  (6.47)  (6.00)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
time trend  -8.61***  56.82***  -3.61***  -6.31***  0.001***  0.004*** 
  (0.92)  (0.66)  (0.63)  (0.73)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Observations  366,002  300,734  366,002  300,734  751,604  705,376 
R-squared  0.28  0.78  0.18  0.07  0.028  0.003 
Notes: *** indicates significant at 1 percent level, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent. Estimates from regression of simulated payments, 
costs, or admissions on POST1-POST7 and quarterly trend. Index cohort is 96q1 patients for IPS, 99q1 patients for PPS. Standard 
errors clustered on health referral region are presented in parentheses.   41 
Table 2c.Treatment and admission policy estimates: effects of Home Health IPS and PPS, joint replacement patients 
   (1) 
Medicare home health payments 
(2) 
Home health costs  
(3) 
Home health admission 
  IPS  PPS  IPS  PPS  IPS  PPS 
Mean  1551  2069  1688  1656  0.636  0.582 
POST1  -47.38***  1,016.08***  -36.14***  64.80***  -0.016***  -0.026*** 
  (2.65)  (6.04)  (2.13)  (1.97)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
POST2  -163.50***  1,042.06***  -69.85***  185.61***  -0.048***  -0.009*** 
  (3.33)  (3.79)  (2.74)  (1.68)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
POST3  -211.77***  1,050.30***  -131.52***  160.54***  -0.052***  -0.023*** 
  (3.92)  (4.13)  (3.58)  (1.73)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
POST4  -264.42***  1,076.90***  -189.89***  164.15***  -0.066***  -0.022*** 
  (4.62)  (3.77)  (4.26)  (1.91)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
POST5  -297.88***  1,156.45***  -212.65***  206.62***  -0.071***  -0.010*** 
  (5.24)  (5.04)  (4.87)  (2.18)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
POST6  -275.80***  1,122.03***  -157.24***  258.25***  -0.057***  0.001 
  (6.37)  (3.37)  (6.25)  (2.52)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
POST7  -288.08***  1,067.57***  -200.14***  250.43***  -0.071***  -0.005*** 
  (6.90)  (3.65)  (6.87)  (2.48)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
time trend  -7.14***  38.86***  -2.80***  0.80***  0.001***  -0.002*** 
  (0.23)  (0.19)  (0.27)  (0.26)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Observations  550,438  534,128  550,438  534,128  834,091  878,528 
R-squared  0.13  0.82  0.05  0.12  0.091  0.027 
Notes: *** indicates significant at 1 percent level, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent. Estimates from a regression of simulated payments, 
costs, or admissions on POST1-POST7 and quarterly trend. Index cohort is 96q1 patients for IPS, 99q1 patients for PPS. Standard 
errors clustered on health referral region are presented in parentheses.   42 
Table 3a. Selection estimates: effects of Home Health IPS and PPS, stroke patients 
   (1) 
Medicare home health payments 
(2) 
Home health costs  
(3) 
Home health admission 
  IPS  PPS  IPS  PPS  IPS  PPS 
Mean  2179  3310  2531  2661  0.344  0.321 
POST1  -0.65  -4.19  -0.73  -1.93  -0.000  -0.001* 
  (2.72)  (2.72)  (2.77)  (2.40)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
POST2  -0.72  1.96  0.19  4.33  -0.001*  -0.001** 
  (3.57)  (4.05)  (3.65)  (3.36)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
POST3  -1.87  -0.16  -2.15  1.25  -0.001*  -0.001* 
  (2.96)  (4.57)  (3.01)  (3.85)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
POST4  -0.99  4.53  -3.31  6.53*  -0.002***  -0.001** 
  (3.61)  (5.01)  (3.74)  (3.92)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
POST5  -4.78  5.88  -6.48  6.22  -0.001**  -0.001** 
  (4.12)  (5.83)  (4.18)  (4.99)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
POST6  -0.69  17.59***  -3.26  11.97**  -0.002***  -0.001 
  (4.49)  (6.22)  (4.45)  (5.01)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
POST7  -1.29  17.88**  -4.55  14.34**  -0.002***  -0.000 
  (4.89)  (7.15)  (4.90)  (5.63)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
time trend  -0.08  -0.51  0.08  -0.38  0.000***  0.000*** 
  (0.40)  (0.72)  (0.41)  (0.54)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Observations  376,426  300,446  376,426  300,446  967,550  900,877 
R-squared  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.000  0.000 
Notes: *** indicates significant at 1 percent level, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent. Estimates from regression of simulated payments, 
costs, or admissions on POST1-POST7 and quarterly trend. Treatment and admission functions for each patient cohort are 
estimated using 99q2 patients for IPS, and 02q2 patients for PPS. Standard errors clustered on health referral region are presented 
in parentheses.   43 
Table 3b. Selection estimates: effects of IPS and PPS, hip fracture patients 
   (1) 
Medicare home health payments 
(2) 
Home health costs  
(3) 
Home health admission 
  IPS  PPS  IPS  PPS  IPS  PPS 
 Mean   2255   3343  2479  2377   0.438  0.441 
POST1  -3.98  -5.52**  -6.20**  -9.70***  0.009***  0.007*** 
  (2.69)  (2.52)  (2.86)  (2.25)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
POST2  -2.62  -1.21  -2.00  -6.37*  -0.001  0.008*** 
  (3.10)  (4.09)  (3.30)  (3.33)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
POST3  2.02  3.77  2.30  -0.78  0.002  0.006*** 
  (3.56)  (4.38)  (3.66)  (3.60)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
POST4  -6.68  1.24  -8.11*  -1.23  0.004***  0.003** 
  (4.31)  (4.59)  (4.42)  (3.85)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
POST5  -7.19*  3.43  -10.09**  -1.61  0.013***  0.009*** 
  (4.21)  (5.22)  (4.48)  (4.29)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
POST6  -0.18  18.87***  -2.41  7.57  0.004**  0.007*** 
  (4.91)  (7.11)  (5.13)  (5.63)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
POST7  -1.33  19.30***  -3.54  9.50  0.005***  0.007*** 
  (5.69)  (7.23)  (5.84)  (5.88)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
time trend  0.50  -0.06  0.89*  0.54  -0.001***  -0.000 
  (0.46)  (0.70)  (0.50)  (0.54)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Observations  326,489  303,891  326,489  303,891  716,300  695,149 
R-squared  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.001  0.000 
Notes: *** indicates significant at 1 percent level, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent. Estimates from regression of simulated payments, 
costs, or admissions on POST1-POST7 and quarterly trend. Treatment and admission functions for each patient cohort are 
estimated using 99q2 patients for IPS, and 02q2 patients for PPS. Standard errors clustered on health referral region are presented 
in parentheses.   44 
Table 3c. Selection estimates: effects of IPS and PPS, joint replacement patients 
   (1) 
Medicare home health payments 
(2) 
Home health costs  
(3) 
Home health admission 
  IPS  PPS  IPS  PPS  IPS  PPS 
  1331  2858  1547  1825  0.595  0.575 
POST1  -18.56***  -16.94***  -22.46***  -20.44***  -0.004***  -0.006*** 
  (2.18)  (2.58)  (2.15)  (2.21)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
POST2  -27.52***  -25.58***  -28.92***  -34.99***  -0.004***  -0.008*** 
  (2.72)  (3.41)  (2.61)  (2.51)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
POST3  -2.07  -0.67  -2.37  -9.40***  0.001  -0.002** 
  (2.73)  (4.27)  (2.58)  (3.03)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
POST4  -6.53**  -9.24**  -7.56***  -15.51***  0.000  -0.004*** 
  (3.06)  (4.54)  (2.89)  (3.23)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
POST5  -25.19***  -20.31***  -29.49***  -27.33***  -0.005***  -0.008*** 
  (3.52)  (5.38)  (3.40)  (3.70)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
POST6  -24.39***  -17.06***  -28.41***  -34.50***  -0.002*  -0.009*** 
  (4.29)  (5.61)  (3.77)  (4.00)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
POST7  -10.04**  2.00  -14.68***  -15.33***  0.002*  -0.003** 
  (4.58)  (6.44)  (4.17)  (4.53)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
time trend  1.17***  1.62***  1.91***  2.88***  -0.000  0.001*** 
  (0.39)  (0.60)  (0.36)  (0.42)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Observations  543,082  548,893  543,082  548,893  853,478  940,014 
R-squared  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.001  0.001 
Notes: *** indicates significant at 1 percent level, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent. Estimates from regression of simulated payments, 
costs, or admissions on POST1-POST7 and quarterly trend. Treatment and admission functions for each patient cohort are 
estimated using 99q2 patients for IPS, and 02q2 patients for PPS. Standard errors clustered on health referral region are presented 
in parentheses.   45 
Table 3d. Selection estimates: effects of IPS and PPS, pooled across hip fracture, joint replacement, and stroke 
   (1) 
Medicare home health payments 
(2) 
Home health costs  
(3) 
Home health admission 
  IPS  PPS  IPS  PPS  IPS  PPS 
Mean  1733  3103  2011  2188  0.455  0.448 
POST1  -6.60***  -7.82***  -8.11***  -11.53***  -0.001**  -0.001*** 
  (2.13)  (1.93)  (2.38)  (2.10)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
POST2  -22.61***  -17.36***  -23.85***  -26.21***  -0.003***  0.002*** 
  (2.86)  (3.16)  (3.12)  (3.09)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
POST3  -2.40  -8.83**  -2.58  -19.29***  -0.002***  0.004*** 
  (3.05)  (3.80)  (3.26)  (3.37)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
POST4  -1.64  -15.59***  -2.53  -26.44***  -0.003***  0.004*** 
  (3.02)  (3.96)  (3.28)  (3.55)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
POST5  -8.34**  -14.82***  -10.29***  -25.60***  -0.001  0.004*** 
  (3.46)  (4.57)  (3.80)  (3.81)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
POST6  -11.90***  -13.59**  -14.28***  -32.56***  -0.003***  0.006*** 
  (4.38)  (5.56)  (4.63)  (4.76)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
POST7  0.48  -3.50  -1.34  -22.95***  -0.003***  0.007*** 
  (4.60)  (5.79)  (4.82)  (4.73)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
time trend  -2.61***  -0.58  -2.51***  -0.59  0.000***  0.001*** 
  (0.39)  (0.58)  (0.42)  (0.45)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Observations  1,245,997  1,153,230  1,245,997  1,153,230  2,537,328  2,536,040 
R-squared  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.000  0.002 
Notes: *** indicates significant at 1 percent level, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent. Estimates from regression of simulated payments, 
costs, or admissions on POST1-POST7 and quarterly trend. Treatment and admission functions (controlling for main effects of 
each tracer condition) for each patient cohort are estimated using 99q2 patients for IPS, and 02q2 patients for PPS. Standard errors 
clustered on health referral region are presented in parentheses.   46 
Table 4. Home Health-IPS:  Simulated changes in patient outcomes, by tracer condition  
   Mortality (90-days post-acute discharge)  Acute readmissions 
 
(1) 
Stroke 
(2) 
Hip 
(3) 
Joint 
(4) 
Stroke 
(5) 
Hip 
(6) 
Joint 
Mean  0.147  0.111  0.008  0.271  0.227  0.121 
POST x Q1  0.002***  0.003***  -0.000***  0.001***  0.007***  0.001*** 
  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
POST x Q2  0.002***  -0.003***  0.000***  -0.000  0.005***  0.001*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
POST x Q3  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000***  0.002***  -0.004***  0.006*** 
  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
POST x Q4  0.002***  -0.004***  0.001***  -0.002***  -0.001***  0.001*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Q1  -0.010***  -0.014***  0.001***  -0.003***  -0.004***  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Q2  -0.018***  -0.024***  -0.001***  -0.011***  -0.014***  0.001*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Q3  -0.014***  -0.021***  0.000**  -0.009***  -0.008***  -0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Linear time trend  0.001***  0.001***  0.000***  0.001***  0.001***  -0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Observations  1,049,510  751,604  834,092  1,049,510  751,604  834,092 
R-squared  0.005  0.013  0.002  0.008  0.016  0.001 
Notes: *** indicates significant at 1 percent level, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent. Estimates come from regression of outcomes on 
quarter indicators, and interaction of POST with quarter indicators. Index cohort is 1996 q1 discharges. Standard errors clustered 
on health referral region are presented in parentheses.     47 
Table 5. Home Health-PPS: Simulated changes in patient outcomes, by tracer condition 
   Mortality (90-days post-acute discharge)  Acute readmissions 
 
(1) 
Stroke 
(2) 
Hip 
(3) 
Joint 
(4) 
Stroke 
(5) 
Hip 
(6) 
Joint 
Mean  0.160  0.127  0.008  0.276  0.246  0.126 
POST x Q1  0.007***  0.007***  0.001***  0.000  0.008***  -0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
POST x Q2  0.006***  0.007***  0.001***  -0.001***  0.005***  0.001*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
POST x Q3  0.003***  0.003***  0.001***  -0.003***  0.002***  0.001 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
POST x Q4  -0.003***  -0.007***  -0.000  -0.005***  -0.002***  -0.003*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Q1  -0.008***  -0.013***  -0.001***  -0.006***  -0.007***  -0.003*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Q2  -0.020***  -0.026***  -0.002***  -0.012***  -0.017***  -0.006*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Q3  -0.015***  -0.022***  -0.002***  -0.006***  -0.014***  -0.002*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Linear time trend  0.000***  0.001***  -0.000***  0.001***  0.001***  0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Observations  933,688  705,376  878,528  933,688  705,376  878,528 
R-squared  0.004  0.010  0.002  0.005  0.014  0.002 
Notes: *** indicates significant at 1 percent level, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent. Estimates come from regression of outcomes on 
quarter indicators, and interaction of POST with quarter indicators.  Index cohort is 1999q1 acute discharges.  Standard errors 
clustered on health referral region are presented in parentheses. 
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Table 6. Difference-in-difference estimates for IPS, health service areas above and below division mean 
number of visits, stroke patients 
  (1) 
Payments 
(2) 
Costs 
(3) 
Admission 
(4) 
Readmissions 
(5) 
Mortality 
Mean  2592  2859  0.386  0.269  0.147 
Above x 
POST1 
-50.29***  -22.86**  0.00***  0.002***  -0.002*** 
(8.15)  (10.00)  (0.00)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Above x 
POST2 
-77.62***  -38.54***  -0.00***  -0.003***  -0.001** 
(8.55)  (10.15)  (0.00)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Above x 
POST3 
-51.83***  -39.85***  -0.00***  -0.000  0.002*** 
(12.12)  (12.96)  (0.00)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Above x 
POST4 
-79.96***  -54.52***  0.00***  0.004***  -0.005*** 
(11.47)  (12.25)  (0.00)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Above x 
POST5 
-61.70***  -60.74***  -0.00  -0.004***  0.002*** 
(14.83)  (17.47)  (0.00)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Above x 
POST6 
-123.25***  -127.07***  -0.01***  -0.005***  0.001*** 
(13.89)  (13.67)  (0.00)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Above x 
POST7 
-32.62**  -66.82***  -0.00**  0.003***  0.004*** 
(14.05)  (16.09)  (0.00)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Above  214.99***  188.73***  0.01**  -0.001  -0.003** 
  (29.33)  (31.11)  (0.00)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
N  403,718  403,634  961,598  961,618  961,338 
R2  0.33  0.22  0.18  0.008  0.006 
Notes: *** indicates significant at 1 percent level, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent. Estimates of regression of simulated payments, 
costs, and admissions on indicators for POST1 through POST7 interacted with “above” division mean indicator and quarter fixed 
effects. Index cohort is 96q1 acute discharges. Standard errors clustered on health referral region are presented in parentheses. 
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Table 7a.  Home Health IPS: Changes in probability of home health use and costs as a function of changes in 
simulated conditional payments 
  Stroke  Hip  Joint 
1. Predicted change in probability of home health use 
Mean  -0.08  -0.04  -0.07 
 (simulated payments) 
 
 
Average effect 
 
0.00 
(0.00) 
 
-0.003 
-0.00*** 
(0.00) 
 
0.009 
0.00*** 
(0.00)  
 
-0.035 
2. Predicted change in conditional home health costs 
Mean  -521.17  -512.57    -225.63 
 (simulated payments)  1.05*** 
(0.01) 
1.08*** 
(0.01) 
 
0.96*** 
(0.01) 
 
3. Predicted change in unconditional home health costs  
Mean  -424.44  -330.52  -263.30 
 (simulated payments) 
 
 
0.53*** 
(0.01) 
0.44*** 
(0.01) 
0.92*** 
(0.01) 
N  74,965  53,686  62,752 
Notes: *** indicates significant at 1 percent level, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent. Standard errors clustered on health 
referral region. Regressions of changes in simulated admissions and costs between 1
st and 14
th quarter on changes in 
simulated payments for index cohort consisting of patients discharged from acute care in 1996 q1.  
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Table 7b.  Home Health PPS: Changes in probability of use and costs as a function of changes in simulated 
conditional payments 
  Stroke  Hip  Joint 
1. Predicted change in probability of home health use 
Mean  -0.03   0.01  -0.04 
 (simulated payments) 
 
 
Average effect 
 
-0.00*** 
(0.00) 
 
-0.017 
0.00 
(0.00) 
 
0.002 
-0.00*** 
(0.00)  
 
-0.017 
2. Predicted change in conditional home health costs 
Mean  97.22  126.46    223.62 
 (simulated payments)  0.77*** 
(0.02) 
0.48*** 
(0.01) 
0.24*** 
(0.01) 
 
3. Predicted change in unconditional home health costs  
Mean  -47.22  82.60  71.42 
 (simulated payments) 
 
 
0.23*** 
(0.01) 
0.24*** 
(0.01) 
0.16*** 
(0.01) 
N  66,692  50,384  62,752 
Notes: *** indicates significant at 1 percent level, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent. Standard errors clustered on health 
referral region. Regressions of changes in simulated admissions and costs between 1
st and 14
th quarter on changes in 
simulated payments for index cohort consisting of patients discharged from acute care in 1999 q1.  
 Appendix Figure 1. Comorbidities and complications for home health patients  
 
a. Total number of comorbidities          b. Total number of complications 
     
 
c. Fraction with three or more comorbidities       d. Fraction with no comorbidities 
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e. Fraction two or more complications        f. Fraction with zero complications 
     
Note: Measures calculated from 100% Medicare Home Health claims data. Lines indicate average number of 
comorbidities and complications for patients in home health with an acute discharge for stroke (solid line), hip fracture 
(dashed line), and lower extremity joint replacement (dotted line). Vertical line in IPS graphs indicates quarter prior to 
Interim Payment System implementation, for PPS graphs quarter prior to Prospective Payment System implementation. 
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Appendix Figure 2.  Relative share of each tracer condition in home health patients within sample period 
 
Notes:  Figure exhibits the fraction of home health admissions for each tracer condition as a fraction of total hip 
fracture, stroke, and lower extremity joint replacement admissions in each quarter.  The first vertical line indicates the 
quarter prior to the Interim Payment System (October 1997) and the second vertical line indicates the quarter prior to 
the Prospective Payment System (October 2000).  
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fraction strokeAppendix Table 1a. Difference-in-difference estimates for IPS, health service 
areas above and below division mean number of visits, hip fracture patients 
  (1) 
Payments 
(2) 
Costs 
(3) 
Admission 
(4) 
Readmissions 
(5) 
Mortality 
Mean  2255  2480  0.461  0.225  0.111 
           
-66.46***  -55.55***  -0.00*  0.004***  0.002***  Above x 
POST1  (6.52) 
 
(9.15)  (0.00)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
-100.87***  -80.88***  0.01***  0.000  -0.003***  Above x 
POST2  (7.25) 
 
(10.06)  (0.00)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
-103.24***  -99.06***  -0.00***  -0.002***  -0.003***  Above x 
POST3  (8.42) 
 
(10.72)  (0.00)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
-116.99***  -114.66***  0.00  0.004***  -0.000  Above x 
POST4  (12.11) 
 
(14.98)  (0.00)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
-98.17***  -82.47***  0.00***  -0.000  -0.000  Above x 
POST5  (11.69) 
 
(13.02)  (0.00)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
-88.89***  -94.09***  0.00  0.006***  0.004***  Above x 
POST6  (12.20) 
 
(15.60)  (0.00)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
-104.38***  -140.96***  -0.00**  0.004***  -0.004***  Above x 
POST7  (11.50) 
 
(13.58)  (0.00)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Above  214.14***  196.84***  0.00  -0.002  0.002** 
  (26.98)  (28.71)  (0.00)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
           
N  337,036  336,966  693,979  693,994  693,826 
R2  0.29  0.18  0.03  0.016  0.013 
Notes: *** indicates significant at 1 percent level, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent. 
Estimates of regression of simulated payments, costs, and admissions on 
indicators for POST1 through POST7 interacted with “above” division mean 
indicator and quarter fixed effects. Index cohort is 96q1 acute discharges. 
Standard errors clustered on health referral region are presented in parentheses.  
Appendix Table 1b. Difference-in-difference estimates for IPS, health service 
areas above and below division mean number of visits, joint replacement 
patients 
  (1) 
Payments 
(2) 
Costs 
(3) 
Admission 
(4) 
Readmissions 
(5) 
Mortality 
Mean  1551  1687  0.637  0.120  0.008 
           
-7.87**  4.77  -0.00  -0.003***  -0.000***  Above x 
POST1  (3.67) 
 
(3.67)  (0.00)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
-40.19***  -40.97***  -0.00*  -0.002***  0.001***  Above x 
POST2  (4.92) 
 
(5.55)  (0.00)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
-43.41***  -45.82***  0.00***  -0.000  0.001***  Above x 
POST3  (5.15) 
 
(5.71)  (0.00)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
-24.03***  -18.36***  -0.00  -0.009***  -0.003***  Above x 
POST4  (5.64) 
 
(5.76)  (0.00)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
-31.38***  -34.10***  -0.01***  -0.004***  -0.000  Above x 
POST5  (6.39) 
 
(6.09)  (0.00)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
-21.97***  -44.45***  -0.01***  0.002***  -0.000***  Above x 
POST6  (7.52) 
 
(8.24)  (0.00)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
-30.32***  -54.58***  -0.01***  0.002***  -0.000  Above x 
POST7  (7.36) 
 
(8.07)  (0.00)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Above  96.16***  81.39***  0.02***  0.001  0.000*** 
  (17.79)  (17.58)  (0.00)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
           
N  509,054  508,928  770,935  770,938  770,770 
R2  0.14  0.06  0.10  0.002  0.003 
Notes: *** indicates significant at 1 percent level, ** 5 percent, * 10 percent. 
Estimates of regression of simulated payments, costs, and admissions on 
indicators for POST1 through POST7 interacted with “above” division mean 
indicator and quarter fixed effects. Index cohort is 96q1 acute discharges. 
Standard errors clustered on health referral region are presented in parentheses. 
 